SSO using OpenID Connect (#3899)

* Add SSO functionality using OpenID Connect

Co-authored-by: Pablo Ovelleiro Corral <mail@pablo.tools>
Co-authored-by: Stuart Heap <sheap13@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Alex Moore <skiepp@my-dockerfarm.cloud>
Co-authored-by: Brian Munro <brian.alexander.munro@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jacques B. <timshel@github.com>

* Improvements and error handling

* Stop rolling device token

* Add playwright tests

* Activate PKCE by default

* Ensure result order when searching for sso_user

* add SSO_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_EMAIL_VERIFICATION

* Toggle SSO button in scss

* Base64 encode state before sending it to providers

* Prevent disabled User from SSO login

* Review fixes

* Remove unused UserOrganization.invited_by_email

* Split SsoUser::find_by_identifier_or_email

* api::Accounts::verify_password add the policy even if it's ignored

* Disable signups if SSO_ONLY is activated

* Add verifiedDate to organizations::get_org_domain_sso_details

* Review fixes

* Remove OrganizationId guard from get_master_password_policy

* Add wrapper type OIDCCode OIDCState OIDCIdentifier

* Membership::confirm_user_invitations fix and tests

* Allow set-password only if account is unitialized

* Review fixes

* Prevent accepting another user invitation

* Log password change event on SSO account creation

* Unify master password policy resolution

* Upgrade openidconnect to 4.0.0

* Revert "Remove unused UserOrganization.invited_by_email"

This reverts commit 548e19995e141314af98a10d170ea7371f02fab4.

* Process org enrollment in accounts::post_set_password

* Improve tests

* Pass the claim invited_by_email in case it was not in db

* Add Slack configuration hints

* Fix playwright tests

* Skip broken tests

* Add sso identifier in admin user panel

* Remove duplicate expiration check, add a log

* Augment mobile refresh_token validity

* Rauthy configuration hints

* Fix playwright tests

* Playwright upgrade and conf improvement

* Playwright tests improvements

* 2FA email and device creation change

* Fix and improve Playwright tests

* Minor improvements

* Fix enforceOnLogin org policies

* Run playwright sso tests against correct db

* PKCE should now work with Zitadel

* Playwright upgrade maildev to use MailBuffer.expect

* Upgrades playwright tests deps

* Check email_verified in id_token and user_info

* Add sso verified endpoint for v2025.6.0

* Fix playwright tests

* Create a separate sso_client

* Upgrade openidconnect to 4.0.1

* Server settings for login fields toggle

* Use only css for login fields

* Fix playwright test

* Review fix

* More review fix

* Perform same checks when setting kdf

---------

Co-authored-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com>
Co-authored-by: Pablo Ovelleiro Corral <mail@pablo.tools>
Co-authored-by: Stuart Heap <sheap13@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Alex Moore <skiepp@my-dockerfarm.cloud>
Co-authored-by: Brian Munro <brian.alexander.munro@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jacques B. <timshel@github.com>
Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@480s>
This commit is contained in:
Timshel
2025-08-08 23:22:22 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent a0c76284fd
commit cff6c2b3af
110 changed files with 8081 additions and 329 deletions

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
// JWT Handling
//
use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
use jsonwebtoken::{errors::ErrorKind, Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header};
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use once_cell::sync::{Lazy, OnceCell};
@@ -10,17 +9,24 @@ use serde::ser::Serialize;
use std::{env, net::IpAddr};
use crate::{
api::ApiResult,
config::PathType,
db::models::{
AttachmentId, CipherId, CollectionId, DeviceId, EmergencyAccessId, MembershipId, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
SendFileId, SendId, UserId,
AttachmentId, CipherId, CollectionId, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId, MembershipId, OrgApiKeyId,
OrganizationId, SendFileId, SendId, UserId,
},
error::Error,
sso, CONFIG,
};
use crate::{error::Error, CONFIG};
const JWT_ALGORITHM: Algorithm = Algorithm::RS256;
pub static DEFAULT_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_hours(2).unwrap());
// Limit when BitWarden consider the token as expired
pub static BW_EXPIRATION: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap());
pub static DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap());
pub static MOBILE_REFRESH_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_days(90).unwrap());
pub static DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY: Lazy<TimeDelta> = Lazy::new(|| TimeDelta::try_hours(2).unwrap());
static JWT_HEADER: Lazy<Header> = Lazy::new(|| Header::new(JWT_ALGORITHM));
pub static JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER: Lazy<String> = Lazy::new(|| format!("{}|login", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
@@ -85,7 +91,7 @@ pub fn encode_jwt<T: Serialize>(claims: &T) -> String {
}
}
fn decode_jwt<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, issuer: String) -> Result<T, Error> {
pub fn decode_jwt<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, issuer: String) -> Result<T, Error> {
let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::new(JWT_ALGORITHM);
validation.leeway = 30; // 30 seconds
validation.validate_exp = true;
@@ -99,11 +105,15 @@ fn decode_jwt<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, issuer: String) -> Result<T, Err
ErrorKind::InvalidToken => err!("Token is invalid"),
ErrorKind::InvalidIssuer => err!("Issuer is invalid"),
ErrorKind::ExpiredSignature => err!("Token has expired"),
_ => err!("Error decoding JWT"),
_ => err!(format!("Error decoding JWT: {:?}", err)),
},
}
}
pub fn decode_refresh(token: &str) -> Result<RefreshJwtClaims, Error> {
decode_jwt(token, JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string())
}
pub fn decode_login(token: &str) -> Result<LoginJwtClaims, Error> {
decode_jwt(token, JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string())
}
@@ -186,6 +196,84 @@ pub struct LoginJwtClaims {
pub amr: Vec<String>,
}
impl LoginJwtClaims {
pub fn new(
device: &Device,
user: &User,
nbf: i64,
exp: i64,
scope: Vec<String>,
client_id: Option<String>,
now: DateTime<Utc>,
) -> Self {
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
// Also These key/value pairs are not used anywhere by either Vaultwarden or Bitwarden Clients
// Because these might get used in the future, and they are added by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// ---
// fn arg: orgs: Vec<super::UserOrganization>,
// ---
// let orgowner: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 0).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orgadmin: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 1).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orguser: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 2).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
// let orgmanager: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 3).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
if exp <= (now + *BW_EXPIRATION).timestamp() {
warn!("Raise access_token lifetime to more than 5min.")
}
// Create the JWT claims struct, to send to the client
Self {
nbf,
exp,
iss: JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: user.uuid.clone(),
premium: true,
name: user.name.clone(),
email: user.email.clone(),
email_verified: !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || user.verified_at.is_some(),
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
// Also These key/value pairs are not used anywhere by either Vaultwarden or Bitwarden Clients
// Because these might get used in the future, and they are added by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
// See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
// ---
// orgowner,
// orgadmin,
// orguser,
// orgmanager,
sstamp: user.security_stamp.clone(),
device: device.uuid.clone(),
devicetype: DeviceType::from_i32(device.atype).to_string(),
client_id: client_id.unwrap_or("undefined".to_string()),
scope,
amr: vec!["Application".into()],
}
}
pub fn default(device: &Device, user: &User, auth_method: &AuthMethod, client_id: Option<String>) -> Self {
let time_now = Utc::now();
Self::new(
device,
user,
time_now.timestamp(),
(time_now + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
auth_method.scope_vec(),
client_id,
time_now,
)
}
pub fn token(&self) -> String {
encode_jwt(&self)
}
pub fn expires_in(&self) -> i64 {
self.exp - Utc::now().timestamp()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
// Not before
@@ -1001,3 +1089,153 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientVersion {
Outcome::Success(ClientVersion(version))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Ord, PartialOrd, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum AuthMethod {
OrgApiKey,
Password,
Sso,
UserApiKey,
}
impl AuthMethod {
pub fn scope(&self) -> String {
match self {
AuthMethod::OrgApiKey => "api.organization".to_string(),
AuthMethod::Password => "api offline_access".to_string(),
AuthMethod::Sso => "api offline_access".to_string(),
AuthMethod::UserApiKey => "api".to_string(),
}
}
pub fn scope_vec(&self) -> Vec<String> {
self.scope().split_whitespace().map(str::to_string).collect()
}
pub fn check_scope(&self, scope: Option<&String>) -> ApiResult<String> {
let method_scope = self.scope();
match scope {
None => err!("Missing scope"),
Some(scope) if scope == &method_scope => Ok(method_scope),
Some(scope) => err!(format!("Scope ({scope}) not supported")),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum TokenWrapper {
Access(String),
Refresh(String),
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RefreshJwtClaims {
// Not before
pub nbf: i64,
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
// Subject
pub sub: AuthMethod,
pub device_token: String,
pub token: Option<TokenWrapper>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuthTokens {
pub refresh_claims: RefreshJwtClaims,
pub access_claims: LoginJwtClaims,
}
impl AuthTokens {
pub fn refresh_token(&self) -> String {
encode_jwt(&self.refresh_claims)
}
pub fn access_token(&self) -> String {
self.access_claims.token()
}
pub fn expires_in(&self) -> i64 {
self.access_claims.expires_in()
}
pub fn scope(&self) -> String {
self.refresh_claims.sub.scope()
}
// Create refresh_token and access_token with default validity
pub fn new(device: &Device, user: &User, sub: AuthMethod, client_id: Option<String>) -> Self {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let access_claims = LoginJwtClaims::default(device, user, &sub, client_id);
let validity = if DeviceType::is_mobile(&device.atype) {
*MOBILE_REFRESH_VALIDITY
} else {
*DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY
};
let refresh_claims = RefreshJwtClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + validity).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub,
device_token: device.refresh_token.clone(),
token: None,
};
Self {
refresh_claims,
access_claims,
}
}
}
pub async fn refresh_tokens(
ip: &ClientIp,
refresh_token: &str,
client_id: Option<String>,
conn: &mut DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<(Device, AuthTokens)> {
let refresh_claims = match decode_refresh(refresh_token) {
Err(err) => {
debug!("Failed to decode {} refresh_token: {refresh_token}", ip.ip);
err_silent!(format!("Impossible to read refresh_token: {}", err.message()))
}
Ok(claims) => claims,
};
// Get device by refresh token
let mut device = match Device::find_by_refresh_token(&refresh_claims.device_token, conn).await {
None => err!("Invalid refresh token"),
Some(device) => device,
};
// Save to update `updated_at`.
device.save(conn).await?;
let user = match User::find_by_uuid(&device.user_uuid, conn).await {
None => err!("Impossible to find user"),
Some(user) => user,
};
let auth_tokens = match refresh_claims.sub {
AuthMethod::Sso if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_auth_only_not_session() => {
AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub, client_id)
}
AuthMethod::Sso if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => {
sso::exchange_refresh_token(&device, &user, client_id, refresh_claims).await?
}
AuthMethod::Sso => err!("SSO is now disabled, Login again using email and master password"),
AuthMethod::Password if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO is now required, Login again"),
AuthMethod::Password => AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub, client_id),
_ => err!("Invalid auth method, cannot refresh token"),
};
Ok((device, auth_tokens))
}